محضر اجتماع اللجنة القانونية المشتركة السادس

تاريخ
December 2, 2008


موقع

الولايات المتحدة




الجهات

السلطة الفلسطينية
الحكومة الاميركية


المجتمعون

ديفد ويلش
صائب عريقات








ملخص
يركز الاجتماع على تعويضات اللاجئين والقضايا المرفوعة على السلطة الفلسطينية ومنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية في اسرائيل والولايات المتحدة. ويبحث المجتمعون سبل تسهيل تنفيذ الاحكام التي أصدرتها محاكم اسرائيلية وكذلك غير اسرائيلية.
النص الكامل
Meeting Minutes

Erekat – Welch

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday December 2, 2008 12:00pm – 1:30pm







Attendance:





Palestinians:



Dr Saeb Erekat (SE)

Rami Dajani







US:



David Welch (DW)

Jonathan Schwartz (JS)

Gemal Hilal (GH)

Payton Knopf











SE: Good meeting in Cairo.



DW: Good that you attended and gave the presentation. Otherwise Amr Moussa predominates.



SE: I told Amr Moussa to behave well. I told him there are millions of dollars turned around from Gaza in the past, and the people are starving there, if you want me to tell Al-jazeera. So he decided to behave well. Abul Gheit gave an excellent presentation on the dialogue with Hamas. I said we don’t want the blame game, and explained what the president did with the Quartet at Sharm, and that there is no secret agreement. Regarding Hamas, no one questions they won the elections -- that they are a political party – but they should have acted as a responsible government. When they were elected I congratulated Haniye as the prime minister of all Palestinians. They should have acted as the government and not as Hamas the movement. It was not democracy that failed, it was Hamas that failed. [SE gave examples of successor states accepting previous obligations, including Khomeini in Iran].



The Syrians (Muallem), Sudan, and Qatar objected that it was unfair that Hamas was not present at the meeting to give the other side. [SE made references to Islamic history]. The next time Sudan is discussed maybe the Darfur rebels should be invited [similar example of Yemen was given]. I told them Palestine will not be a card. I have the statement and you should vote on it. It was 11 hours and 40 minutes to pass the statement as introduced by Abul Gheit, condemning that the dialogue did not take place as scheduled on Nov 10, that Abu Mazen should continue in office until elections are held in accordance with the Basic Law.



DW: How were the Saudis?



SE: They were good. Saud al-Faisal interrupted the Sudanese complaint about the absence of Hamas; he said that Saeb Erekat spoke like a statesman. Bahrain and Oman were tough too.



DW: Do you expect the dialogue to resume?



SE: Yes, but not soon. Egypt was slapped, so it won’t restart easily.



DW: The situation with the hujjaj in Gaza, is it because of the tougher position by Saudi? …



SE: They are waiting. There are people who think Barak Obama was elected to the Iranian parliament! They don’t realize that US policy won’t change; that it is not made by one person.



DW: They’re in for a big surprise. What do you think of Olmert’s presentations?



SE: [Hands DW paper with questions submitted to Olmert in the past]. There was no proposal – there was nothing in writing. We asked Olmert to respond to the questions and explain in writing what he is proposing but he didn’t respond. I asked him again on November 16 – there was no response, no map.



So we proposed: basically on territory we know it is the 67 border in general, with modifications … [SE described briefly the Palestinian proposal]. Instead he wants 6.5% (not clear of what) … the settlement blocs, Ariel, Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion. We offered 2% swap that would allow 70% of settlers to remain. We had no answer.



DW: You know he said to Abu Mazem he has a three page document.



SE: I did not receive it. He declined [?]. He said how about meeting with Shalom and his team.



DW: map experts…



SE: I don’t know who Shalom will bring. They are nervous. Tal called twice since I got here. The committees continue to meet. Four committees met last week with Udi Dekel and Tal Becker, others were postponed because of this trip. Things that are agreed, are agreed. We have Is and Ps, things that require decision. We have the matrix. They don’t want this because of the elections. They are afraid of leaks. If Olmert doesn’t trust us, they can give their [paper] to you. We can also give you our position, and what we offer on each issue. This way you can preserve irreversibility of the process – by getting something from them in writing. Of course it won’t be the 11th ‘commandment’ for the next government, but since we said “irreversible” we will know where we reached.

DW: Regarding Olmert’s presentations, how does Livni see them?



SE: They [Livni and Becker] think we agreed to the approach of confidentiality, ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, that we won’t have partial agreements, or declarations, and that the process is irreversible. We said this at Sharm with Condi, and we should honour it.



DW: On irreversibility Olmert has some proposals that …



SE: So give them to us. We have not received it. We don’t know what it means. This is unfair. We need something writing with such sensitive issues. Otherwise how can you say we have an offer?



DW: In the absence of that is there any “common view” on the status of the negotiations even though there is no agreement.



SE: I’ve been asking them about this since August. Olmert wants to lock in that Palestinians agreed to his proposal. But what this proposal is we don’t know. If they are worried that any of this can be used against them in the elections, I told them that two of us (Tal and I) can come to Washington to work on it. To protect the process, we are willing to engage on a joint progress report, a matrix that shows that positions.



DW: Their answer?



SE: She’s worried about leakage.



DW: So she wants it confidential …



SE: Yes, we too. This is like a bypass surgery – can look messy.



DW: But what value can it have if it’s confidential other than handing over the process to the new administration?



SE: It will explain to the next administration – this is where we are.



DW: But we already know that. We need to preserve, but also build. If it’s not confidential then you have an opportunity.



SE: I can give you my positions on paper. It’s up to you to do with it what you want.



DW: How do you assess the Arab understanding of all of this?



SE: Jordan and Egypt are fully briefed on all issues and are fully on board. The Saudis (through Saud al-Faisal) are fully aware. We have a channel with Syria, and they are somewhat aware (through the president and Muhammad Naseef). We are trying to set up a channel with Lebanon, particularly as they are affected by refugees, security and water. [discussion on approach to briefing Lebanon]. \



SE: Saud al-Faisal is very supportive, and wants an agreement. He sent, or will be sending, a letter to Obama on the Arab Peace Initiative (API).



DW: From Saudi Arabia?



SE: As Head of the Arab Council of Ministers. I asked them to be proactive. He is committed to the two state solution. They [the council] will do it.



DW: Do you think it’s useful to gather this support and express further support to the negotiations, if there’s enough value in the process for you to want it to be irreversible?



SE: Saudi’s main concern is Jerusalem – not swaps and neighbourhoods. To them Jerusalem is the Haram.



DW: So they want to know who will “own” it?



SE: The status. I told them: I cannot tell you. What defines this “holy basin,” what it includes … I don’t know. [Reference to the difficulties on getting Jerusalem addressed, Shas, and the Annapolis statement on the core issues]. To Livni’s credit, she did not become prime minister because she refused to say that Jerusalem was not on the table. We said at the beginning: no partial agreements, no fragmentation, no declarations. Why is Olmert now saying 3 pages?



GH: How does Livni want to proceed, if she wants to be elected?



SE: She believes negotiations should go on. I can appear with her as an academic in public events to demonstrate we have something since Annapolis. We are arranging for Abu Mazen to see her. We are worried about what Olmert is telling us.



Winning elections is about math, not what she says or does with us. Kadima can win only if the centre-left is organized [SE discussed internal party dynamics in Israel]. This is the only way to block Netanyahu.



GH: Would Livni support the idea of a matrix?



SE: She is cautious – walking in a minefield. Tal called me last night at 2am Tel Aviv time and he usually sleeps at 10.



JS: The Barack Obama team: do you plan to confide in them before or after he takes office?



SE: Before Obama’s visit to Ramallah and the campaign I was put in touch with Dr Susan Rice …



GH: Let me add: when Obama spoke to Abu Mazen, he told him “I won’t wait till January 20th. I will choose someone from us to be in touch, to start working with Palestinians and Israelis”.



SE: To be honest, I don’t know. Biden and Jones are my friends, I sent them an email to congratulate them…



GH: There is one president at a time …



SE: I am not meeting with anyone else. The only other meeting I have is with Dan Abraham. Olmert was calling him every hour. I will tell him to drop it.



JS: The secretary wants to personally brief the incoming team. She will take the decisions on what to share. If she offers her opinions, the Obama people can check, or the two sides can take the initiative to brief them. There are many ways of doing this.



DW: The president wants to ensure a smooth transition. [Discussion on upcoming meeting between Abu Mazen and Bush – Dec 17, 18 being tentative dates]



JS: During the transition the secretary will “educate” the successor. Since we have one president at a time, you should not be briefing the next team before they are in office.



SE: Regarding the new team, neither we nor the Israelis will deal with them without your suggestion or approval. … We will deal with you till Jan 20. Any recommendations from you will be respected regarding how to deal with the next administration. We are not rushing. You should help us get answers to these questions [to Olmert] in writing. You cannot leave it to speculation as to what Olmert said or didn’t say. You can bring me and Tal off the radar. We can walk you through it – provided we preserve ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’.



DW: There are two different conceptual exercises: One is the status of the negotiations. You were personally involved, and your teams. We have a good understanding of them. We were also involved in some of that (the trilaterals).



SE: There were 261 meetings – you are fully briefed.



DW: We have that, and your views, and we have been in the trilateral. So we have our summary – internal and confidential. We can use that to brief the successors.



But the question is the second exercise, what to do with Olmert’s proposals? While they are not clear, or in writing, they represent something. Since you want irreversibility, how can we use this?



SE: Ask for it in writing.



DW: I asked Shalom. He said proposals are not put in writing.



SE: Shalom will not tell you it’s a proposal. In other matters we have put things in writing. I will not deviate from the rules we put in the Quartet statement.





END